This article explores how the death of Osama bin Laden was narrated by the Obama Administration between the night of his killing and the 2012 State of the Union address. Three aspects of this unfolding story, in particular, are explored: i) Descriptions of the operation itself; ii) Constructions of bin LadenÕs life and character; and, iii) Accounts of the significance and likely consequences of his killing. The article argues that the narration of these events was characterised, first, by considerable discursive continuity with the war on terrorism discourse of George W. Bush. And, second, by a gradual removal or ÔforgettingÕ of bin Laden and the circumstances of his death. Each of these dynamics, we argue, contributed to the legitimisation of his killing, demonstrating the importance of narrative remembrance and forgetting alike for the conduct and justification of liberal violence.
Introduction
This article explores how Barack ObamaÕs Administration narrated the killing of Osama bin Laden in a US Special Forces mission in Pakistan on 2 May 2011. Employing a discourse analytic approach, 1 the article focuses, specifically, on three dimensions of the storying of this event within elite political discourse: (i) descriptions of the operation that ended in bin LadenÕs death; (ii) accounts of bin LadenÕs life and character; and, (iii) evaluations of his killingÕs significance. The article makes two primary observations. First, that the narration of bin LadenÕs killing demonstrated considerable discursive continuity with the Ôwar on terrorismÕ discourse of the George W. Bush administration. As demonstrated below, numerous recognisable themes from that paradigm returned throughout each of our three dimensions, despite ObamaÕs apparent abandonment of this discursive framework. 2 The articleÕs second observation is that the writing of this event was also characterised by a gradual removal or ÔforgettingÕ of bin Laden the man, and the circumstances of his death. This took place, first, via a stylistic shift toward ÔcleanerÕ language and metaphorical description. And, second, through an increasing focus on the consequences -rather than the fact and details -of his death for the US and its constituent publics. The articleÕs primary argument is that these dynamics of discursive continuity (with the Bush administration) and discontinuity (within the administrationÕs (re)telling of this story) are intimately connected. Each, we argue, contributed to the legitimisation of the assassination of bin Laden. In the former, this took place via a return to the war on terrorÕs ethical certainties, especially in constructions of terrorism, heroism, cowardice, and justice. In the latter, it occurred via a gradual de-emphasising of the administrationÕs responsibility for bin LadenÕs death, and the legal and moral questions integral to this use of lethal force. This gradual effacement, we argue, evidences the centrality of narrative forgetting 3 Ð as much as remembrance Ð to the organisation and routinisation of particular types of violence.
In making these arguments, this article seeks to contribute to three distinct literatures. The first is the wealth of contemporary studies exploring terrorismÕs discursive and performative productions. Heterogeneities notwithstanding, this work offers an important contribution to recent critiques of terrorism research and the ostensible surety of this sub-fieldÕs conceptual and normative foundations. 4 Richard JacksonÕs Writing the War on Terrorism remains the fullest example here, in which the construction of events (9/11), identities (terrorists and Americans), threats (terrorism) and ethics (around the war on terror) are traced across the language of the Bush AdministrationÕs war on terror. 5 For the purposes of this article, this literature is significant because of the scepticism it fosters toward the rubric of ÔterrorismÕ and its apparent ontological stability. The broadly constructivist framework shared by much (though not all) of this work, means (counter-)terrorism can be approached -as in this article -not as an extra-discursive reality to be discovered or known. Rather, as a Òsocial construction, hence a social fact produced in discourseÓ. 6 This facilitates the asking of radically different research questions, not least: how is ÔterrorismÕ produced discursively, and what do (re)productions of ÔterrorismÕ do socially and politically? Anchoring this rethinking of terrorism research and its purpose, therefore, is an appeal that scholars, Òfocus on the discourse by which the terrorist actor and his or her actions are constitutedÓ.
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Second, as constructions of (counter-)terrorism have stimulated a vast contemporary literature within IR and beyond, so too have practices, technologies and objects of 14 This continuous and selective engagement with the past is precisely the space wherein social actors exercise agency through their rewriting and reinventing of that which has taken place. This is done not only in the context of concerns about the present and future. 15 But, in addition, through the interplay of remembrance and its ostensible antithesis, forgetting, about which far less has been written.
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The final literature to which this article contributes concerns the role and significance of discourse(s) within IR. Although we focus primarily on the use of language, our analysis follows those -inspired by Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau, in particular -for whom the social and discursive are coterminous. 17 This scholarshipÕs importance is in its detailing of the ceaseless and contested dynamics through which meaning is imposed on the social world, This article seeks to contribute to these literatures in three primary ways. First, its principal contribution is empirical, concentrating on bin LadenÕs killing as an under-explored case study through which to investigate the discursive production of (counter-)terrorism, and the importance of dialectics of memory and forgetting therein. Second, it seeks a conjunctural contribution by approaching elite discourse on this event as an opportunity to consider the war on terrorÕs rhetorical as well as material longevity. And, third, the article makes a conceptual contribution, contributing to understandings of the legitimisation (and condemnation) of violence through tracing the significance of practices of forgetting within articulations of meaning in global political life.
The articleÕs methodology employs a discourse analysis of over one hundred linguistic texts Ð speeches, interviews, and press briefings Ð produced within the White House, Department of Defense and US intelligence community. Inclusion in this corpus was limited by two criteria. First, the time of its creation, with our focus here on the eight months between bin LadenÕs death and ObamaÕs January 2012 State of the Union address. This period, importantly, incorporated the tenth anniversary of the events of 11 September 2001. The second criterion was explicit or implicit reference to bin Laden, the circumstances of his death, or the consequences of his killing. Our analysis of these texts in the remainder of the article proceeds in four sections. These focus on narrative constructions of bin LadenÕs death, life, and the consequences of his killing, respectively, before assessing the implications of narrative forgetting for this case study and beyond. 
Killing bin Laden
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Mission: Accomplished
The fluidity within this (re)writing of bin LadenÕs death was also apparent within representations of the operation itself. Indeed, this was explicitly discussed, and linked to the challenges of swiftly releasing information to the public which would inevitably later be ÒreviewedÓ, ÒupdatedÓ and ÒelaboratedÓ. 43 Gradually, however, a coherent narrative developed that focused, primarily, on the missionÕs courageous prosecution. The Òheroic actionsÓ 44 of the Special Operations forces, praised by the Vice PresidentÕs wife, were also acknowledged by the President: ÒI want to again recognize the heroes who carried out this incredibly dangerous missionÓ. 45 In the words of the First Lady, the operationÕs prosecutors
were Òa small group of brave men, dropped by helicopter, half a world away in the dead of nightÉinto unknown danger inside the lair of the most sought after man in the worldÓ. , of Òprecision and skillÓ seen by the Òentire worldÓ. 52 Likewise, the 
Mission: Legitimate
Beyond reflecting on the missionÕs success, the Obama Administration also repeatedly emphasised its legitimacy. The language of justice was particularly frequent here, featuring from ObamaÕs very first announcement of bin LadenÕs death: Òon nights like this one, we can say to those families who have lost loved ones to al QaedaÕs terror: Justice has been doneÓ. 66 In the coming days, the President, First Lady, Defense Secretary and Press Secretary would all speak explicitly of ÒjusticeÓ being ÒbroughtÓ by American forces and ÒreceivedÓ by a ÒdeservingÓ victim in an Òentirely appropriateÓ way. 67 It was a language that, very explicitly, continued core discursive themes of BushÕs war on terrorism and its promises of frontier justice. As he had earlier stated, terrorists are Ònothing but a bunch of cold blooded killers and thatÕs the way weÕre going to treat themÓ; 68 and Òwhether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be doneÓ. 69 On 2 May 2011, the Obama Administration could argue this had finally been achieved.
This depiction of the operation as a bringer of justice was complemented by other constructions of its legitimacy. First, precision in its execution was repeatedly emphasised in just war-inflected framings of Òa targeted operationÓ, which took care to minimise Òcollateral damageÓ, 70 by avoiding Òcivilian casualtiesÓ 71 and striving Òto protect É noncombatants.Ó
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Within initial writings of the mission, this caution was even more noteworthy given the ÔresistanceÕ encountered by US forces. As one official stated: ÒThe American team engaged in a firefightÉOsama bin Laden did resistÓ. 73 The harm that befell some, in this writing, was an outcome only of their belligerence: Òthe woman who was shot in the leg physically assaulted the -or attempted to assault -or charged, rather, one of the U.S. assaultersÓ. 74 Second, the Administration stressed the considerable care and attention that was extended to the treatment of bin LadenÕs body. Here, the requirements of Islamic tradition were repeatedly invoked: his corpse having been, Òhandled in accordance with Islamic practiceÓ 75 and his burial performed in Òstrict conformance with Islamist preceptsÓ. 76 83 Taken together, the Administration remained certain of the rightness of its operation, refusing to Òapologize for the action that É this President tookÓ as it was Òsimply beyond a doubt É that he had the right and the imperative to do thisÓ. 84 In Press Secretary Jay CarneyÕs words, the Administration felt Òvery strongly that the successful mission against a mass murderer of Americans and people around the world was entirely justifiedÓ. The attention afforded the legitimacy of bin LadenÕs killing was, perhaps, unsurprising. Although condemnation of the operation may not have been particularly widespread, serious concerns were articulated from several sources, not least in relation to the absence of legal processes, whether bin Laden was armed, and Pakistani sovereignty. In one critical view of the language of justice that so permeated this unfolding narrative, for instance: Òthe killing of an unarmed man is always going to leave a very uncomfortable feeling because it doesn't look as if justice is seen to be done, in those circumstancesÓ. Within this critique, Òthe different versions of eventsÓ that had emerged and evolved after the operation had Ònot done a great deal to helpÓ, given how ÒimportantÓ it was Òthat justice [was] seen to be observedÓ in dealing with a Òwar criminalÓ. 86 As this section has shown, the Obama AdministrationÕs response to critiques such as these was multifaceted, drawing, frequently, upon the just war tradition prominent in the war on terrorÕs earlier writings. 87 Thus, beyond straightforward designations of the actions as ÔjustÕ, there was a repeated emphasis on presidential intent to ÔgetÕ bin Laden, the international backing this enjoyed, and the operationÕs careful precision.
bin Laden, Osama, b. 1957, d. 2011
As events leading to bin LadenÕs death were being recounted, the Obama Administration also took the opportunity to revisit the man himself and his legacy, reawakening a number of the war on terrorÕs discursive themes in the process. 88 The language of terrorism was unsurprisingly prominent here. For instance, bin Laden was Òthe leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist whoÕs responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and childrenÓ. 89 He was, however, no ordinary terrorist, rather: Òthe most infamous terrorist of our timeÓ; 90 the ÒbutcherÓ 91 and Òsworn enemyÓ 92 who Òstarted this warÓ, 93 and a continuing
Òdanger to all humanityÓ. 94 The writing of present threat was important, with bin LadenÕs significance in this emergent obituary stretching far beyond responsibility for past violences. He was still, Òthe number one guy for al-QaedaÓ; 95 Òan important symbolic figureÓ; 96 and, Òthe only leader that al Qaeda had ever knownÓ. 97 Questions over his continued centrality to al Qaeda, moreover, were misplaced; here was an individual Òactively involved in plotting operations and in directing the daily operations of the group...throwing operational ideas out there and...specifically directing other al Qaeda membersÓ. 98 Intelligence materials recovered in the raid offered sufficient evidence to confirm that Òbin Laden remained an active leader in al Qaeda, providing strategic, operational and tactical instructions to the groupÓ. 99 . Second, this discursive discrediting also made use of repeated constructions of cowardice and vanity, with bin LadenÕs apparent withdrawal from the frontlines of conflict a prominent theme here. In the words of John Brennan, for instance, bin LadenÕs ÒhidingÓ spoke to Òthe nature of the individual he wasÓ. 107 BushÕs earlier mocking of an enemy inclined to Òhit and runÓ and then Òhide in cavesÓ was, in this way, reworked to account for bin LadenÕs more recent cosseted lifestyle. 108 The grand scale of his Ò$1 millionÓ compound 109 And, when fighting eventually arrived at his door, this ÔbutcherÕsÕ cowardice was confirmed as he opted to hide, Òbehind women who were put in front of him as a shieldÓ. 113 In sum, bin LadenÕs obituarisation by ObamaÕs Administration clearly offered an opportunity for further condemnation of the man widely viewed as the war on terrorÕs instigator. Absent Ð or forgotten Ð here was any sustained reflection on the contexts or aims of his conflict with the United States. Politics only surfaced in expressions of the liberal demands deemed antithetic to bin LadenÕs own struggle for which others across the Middle East and North Africa were now striving. Instead, he was demonised and discredited as a cowardly terrorist, reinforcing the writing of legitimacy into his killing (or disappearance) explored above.
After bin Laden
A third theme of particular -and increasing -concern in the AdministrationÕs framing of bin LadenÕs killing was its likely future significance. 114 Four major consequences of his death were posited throughout the following months, each adding to the sense that we had witnessed an Òhistoric and singularÓ event, 115 of ÒincredibleÓ, ÒextraordinaryÓ, 116 and
ÒmonumentalÓ proportions. 117 These concerned: al QaedaÕs future, (inter)national security, the US/Pakistan relationship, and the American national identity, respectively.
First, on al QaedaÕs future, the Obama Administration framed the operation as Òthe most significant victoryÓ 118 and Ògreatest achievementÓ 119 of the war on terror to date. This Òmajor blowÓ not only concerned the removal of al QaedaÕs active leader, after a decade-long conflict. It also related to the impact of his death for would-be terrorists. As a Senior Defense Official noted, his killing Òshould send a signalÓ indicating ÒU.S. resolveÓ and ÒcapabilityÓ to bring terrorists to ÒjusticeÓ. 120 The operation would encourage Òother al Qaeda leaders out thereÓ to re-evaluate Òtheir safety and securityÓ. 121 Thus, after Òwhat occurred on SundayÓ, 122 they Òshould be watching their backÓ because America would Òfinish the jobÓ. 123 Yet, as this framing implied, al Qaeda would likely outlive its figurehead. Although Òthe head off the snakeÓ had been removed, Òthe body, while battered É is still thereÓ. 124 Second, on US and global security, the Obama Administration emphasised that bin LadenÕs demise increased the safety of Americans, thus rendering the world a Òbetter placeÓ. 125 That
Osama bin Laden would Ònever again threaten the United States of AmericaÓ was a frequent feature of this unfolding narrative. 126 Optimism, however, was moderately cautious, given that there were still Òthreats out thereÓ. 127 The Ôbody of the snakeÕ, in particular, presented the potential for Òrevenge attacksÓ 128 , with a need, therefore, for American Òhyper-vigilanceÓ. 129 As such, while the mission was a significant step toward American and global security, Americans and their allies should be Òunder no illusion that killing bin Laden removes the threat entirelyÓ. 130 In short, the US was Ònot done going after terroristsÓ. 131 Third, AmericaÕs relationship with Pakistan was also widely discussed due to two principal reasons: (i) the suspicion that Pakistan had been either Òinvolved or incompetentÓ 132 in bin LadenÕs Abbottabad residence; and, (ii) the operationÕs questionable legality given its conduct on Pakistani soil. The dominant portrayal of this relationship emphasised the mutuality of interests in the combating of al Qaeda. Carney, for instance, stressed the importance of the relationship for American Ònational security interestsÓ. 133 Continuing counter-terrorism cooperation was, however, also deemed important to Pakistan: Òbin Laden is responsible for supporting operations that have killed scores of Pakistanis as well, so thereÕs a mutual interest in us working togetherÓ. 134 And, as was frequently noted, Òmore terrorists have been killed on Pakistani soil than probably any other countryÓ. 135 The narration of this symbiotic relationship benefitted from invocation of historical and contemporary collaboration, whilst also acknowledging the challenges thereof in Òa complicated relationship that is not perfect and that requires a lot of attentionÓ. 136 In this sense, although Pakistan presented Òa steadfast partner É in some areasÓ of counterterrorism, 137 difficulties in others ensured the Obama Administration would stay true to his predecessorÕs approach of Ôunilateralism where necessaryÕ: 138 Òworking with the Pakistanis whenever we can, but also working on our ownÓ. 139 Fourth, almost immediately, the killing was also inserted into the American historical narrative Ð Òthe story of our historyÓ 140 Our national story has been, and still is, the envy of the world. Indeed, the death of Osama bin Laden after a decade-long manhunt by the United States reminded us earlier this month that, as President Obama said, when faced with tough times Ôwe do not falterÕ. 147 First, then, bin LadenÕs death was proof that ÒAmerica does not forget; America will ensure that justice is doneÓ. 148 Second, beyond accounting for bin LadenÕs ultimate defeat, identitypremised narrations also helped to explain the manner of the operationÕs prosecution: his body was treated with respect, for instance, Òbecause thatÕs who we areÓ and Òwe feel very comfortable with the factÓ. 149 Third, the scripting of (an exceptional) American national identity accounted for the refusal to release post-mortem images: ÒThatÕs not who we are. We donÕt trot out this stuff as trophiesÓ. 150 And, fourth, the victims of 9/11 and their families received particular attention in this writing, with bin LadenÕs killing increasingly turned into a mechanism for that tragedyÕs remembrance. For Obama, it Òsent a signal around the world that we have never forgotten the extraordinary sacrifices that were made on September 11 th Ó. 151 Although, Òa moment long in coming, for the 9/11 families, for this city, and for our nationÓ 152 and a Òbittersweet momentÉfor many families of the victimsÓ, 153 bin LadenÕs death was scripted as providing a Òsense of closureÓ. 154 And, as Obama put it, on learning of bin LadenÕs death America(ns) Òexperienced the same sense of unity that prevailed on 9/11Ó. 155 Within this writing of identity, unity and closure, it was, therefore, entirely:
appropriate and fitting [that the President] travel to New YorkÉin the wake of the successful mission É in order to recognise the terrible loss that New York suffered on 9/11, and to acknowledge the burden that the families of the victims, the loved ones of the victims, have been carrying with them since 9/11, almost 10 years.
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Framing and Forgetting
The articleÕs final section now turns to remembering and forgetting -and also therefore continuity and discontinuity -in the writing of bin LadenÕs killing.
Remembering (and) the War on Terror
A first point to note from the above discussion is the extent to which bin LadenÕs killing engendered a return to core discursive themes that dominated his predecessorÕs war on terror. The demonisation of bin Laden and his supporters, for example, via the language of terrorism and cowardice, was prevalent throughout the tenure of the Bush Administration. 157 The framing of Al QaedaÕs struggle as anachronistic, 158 and only contingently related to Islam, 159 were also direct continuations of earlier representations with which Americans were already well familiar. The writing of American violences by each of these Presidents, moreover, is also characterised by considerable discursive overlap: the language of justice, heroism and professionalism, within broader appeals to exceptionalism, being recurrent.
Although these discursive themes extend back beyond BushÕs presidency, 161 they also shed light on the war on terrorÕs longevity. Their re-emergence under Obama, indeed, may indicate the continuing hegemony enjoyed by this discourse; one Jackson explains by its institutionalisation in American life and connection to longstanding political myths. 162 Alternatively, these continuities may be taken simply as further evidence of the lack of political or rhetorical distance between Obama and Bush in relation to the necessity of combating terrorism and securing the US. 163 Yet, however we explain it, this writing of self and other in familiar and simplified language clearly contributed to more than the condemnation of bin Laden, the ÔterroristÕ. It also, simultaneously, contributed to the justification of his killing and the operation from which it resulted. Discursive continuities with the War on Terror, in short, enabled this killing to be written as heroic and professional, successfully completed according to the laws of war, ethically conducted in accord with just war principles, and significant in the removal of an active terrorist of dubious moral worth.
Forgetting (and) bin LadenÕs death
The articleÕs introduction included a brief overview of contemporary literatures on social, collective and narrative memory. In it, we noted that practices of remembrance and commemoration have attracted far greater attention, and are subsequently better understood, than dynamics of forgetting. Part of the reason for this relates, simply, to the challenges of identifying and accessing the forgotten given its status as partial or total absence. 164 At the same time, this forgetting of forgetting might also have something to do with the widespread valorisation of remembrance, and concomitant view of forgetting as failing, negation or loss in everyday and scholarly usage. 165 In spite of these challenges -methodological and normative Ð an important and growing body of literature on the processes of forgetting is now beginning to emerge. Although diverse, two primary insights for this article emerge from this work. First, forgetting is itself shorthand for a large range of practices. There are different types of forgetting, which take place in different sites and locations, by different agents. Connerton, for instance, identifies seven forms of forgetting, spanning the repressive and forceful erasure of memories, through to tacit, shared silences about difficult pasts. 166 GregoryÕs concept of Ôcolonial amnesiaÕ offers an alternative framework, and one that connects to this articleÕs normative concern in countering amnesiac histories of violence. 167 Colonial amnesia is, in part, shorthand for processes of narrative forgetting that enable and legitimise imperial violence. To forget is to make history, which, too often, serves as a platform for present and future liberal violences.
Second, this literature also usefully demonstrates that the drivers of forgetting are multiple and complex. On the one hand, forgetting occurs as a necessary response to the limits of human cognition, and to the need for simplification in order to narrate, remember, or otherwise make sense of the past. 168 As Ricoeur argues, Òwe cannot tell a story without eliminating or dropping some important event according to the kind of plot we intend to build.Ó 169 At the same time, because forgetting is an inherently social phenomenon (as is memory), what can be forgotten will be constrained by social contexts, conventions, commemorative forms, political interests and the like. Thus, while, Òthe ability to remember, to speak of or to commemorate one thing may implicitly be predicated on the ability to keep silent on othersÉmany of these silences and exclusions are far from benign and often reflect real desires to mute certain aspects of the pastÓ. 170 Here, the political imperative to Ônever forgetÕ 9/11 is intimately connected to the narrative forgetting of the less sanguine facts of the War on TerrorÕs prosecution, such as the murky legal circumstances of bin LadenÕs death.
In the context of bin LadenÕs death, at least two types of forgetting may be identified, each of which emerged within the short period after those events with which we are here concerned.
The first concerns what Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger term Ôcovert silencesÕ: those mechanisms that work to de-emphasise, distract from or diminish the importance of aspects of that which is being remembered. 171 This type of forgetting involves pushing uncomfortable or less palatable aspects of a past event Ôinto the marginsÕ; not as an exercise in outright denial, but rather, as a way of de-emphasising through highlighting the wider importance of an unfolding story. Two instances of this type of forgetting have been explored in this article. The first concerns the event of bin LadenÕs death and the gradual anaesthetisation of the language employed in its recounting. Although initially framed in descriptive, corporeal ways, ÔdeadÕ and ÔkilledÕ gradually became ÔlostÕ, ÔremovedÕ and ÔgoneÕ. His death, in other words, became increasingly alluded to, and therefore acknowledged only implicitly. The second example concerns questions of agency in relation to bin LadenÕs killing. Here, an initial claiming of responsibility, even early triumphalism, was gradually re-narrated in such a way that worked to remove his deathÕs protaganists from the events. Indeed, the actions of the US military machine became discussed, far more frequently, in terms of its treatment of bin LadenÕs (dead) body than in its role in engendering the need for a burial. Again, though, this was not a complete denial: the diegetic conditions of this storyÕs telling such as its narrators and sites contained within them an implicit acknowledgement of responsibility. But, it was another example of de-amplification or forgetting through covert silences: an allusion to what had taken place, but one lacking any explicit engagement therein.
These types of silence both sat alongside and were gradually replaced by a second style of forgetting described by Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger: forgetting via overt silences. 172 Where covert silences work primarily through de-emphasis, overt silences refer to those aspects of a past entirely unmentioned. A number of aspects of bin LadenÕs death may fit into this notion. Most obviously -and reproducing silences of the earlier war on terror -there was no explicit discussion here of bin LadenÕs ambitions and politics, including the motivations behind his campaign against the Ôfar enemyÕ of the United States and its allies. 173 Absent, too, was any sustained engagement with the more ÔrobustÕ intelligence techniques that may have contributed to his killing. Perhaps more interesting, though, is the gradual writing out of bin Laden himself from this narrative as attention turned to the significance of his killing: whether in terms of (inter)national security or US identity. Although his death functions as a point of departure for those projected futures, its significance as an event became increasingly diminished as events yet to arrive increasingly took centre stage.
Conclusion
This gradual forgetting of the operationÕs target may be seen, simply, as a continuation of a discursive process in place since 9/11. As the ÔfailureÕ to capture or kill bin Laden stretched into months and years, the Ôwar on terrorÕ had been increasingly framed around accomplishments and goals stretching far beyond this one individual. 174 In this process, Osama bin Laden had, perhaps, already begun to decrease in importance: never completely forgotten, but also never a yardstick by which to judge the successes of this conflictÕs prosecution. Alternatively we might approach this forgetting as a product of a political desire to capitalise on this eventÕs patriotic potentialities by returning to the memory of 9/11 and its victims. More prosaically, perhaps bin LadenÕs death was simply overtaken by events. The Arab Spring dominated much of the White HouseÕs attention throughout 2011, both prior to and after bin LadenÕs death. The planned withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, too, was central within political discourse at the time, as were the economic travails confronted by the US. In this sense, perhaps Ôbusiness as usualÕ simply intruded on the (re)telling of this story over time. As Jay Carney recounted on 9 May: on the Monday after Osama bin Laden was eliminated, we had a meeting I was in that was policyfocused on a non-national security issue for 90 minutes with the President, and bin Laden was never mentioned -less than 24 hours after the event.
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